Gloire
In Schopenhauer’s view, fame is the positive counterpart of honor—and its exact opposite: where honor merely attests that one is no exception, fame declares that one *is* one. It cannot be claimed—no one can bestow it upon themselves—but is earned through an extraordinary production, be it an act or a work. Actions depend on circumstance and witness; works, however, endure and stand on their own, which makes their fame the most certain and the most belated.
Honneur et gloire sont jumeaux, mais à la façon des Dioscures dont l’un, Pollux, était immortel, et dont l’autre, Castor, était mortel : l’honneur est le frère mortel de l’immortelle gloire.
Schopenhauer closes the chapter on what we represent with an image: honor and glory are twins, but like the Dioscuri—one, Pollux, immortal, the other, Castor, mortal—“honor is the mortal brother of immortal glory.” This formula holds only for the highest glory, true glory; there are also fleeting kinds, as vain as honor is fragile.
The difference lies in the nature of merit. Schopenhauer states it plainly: “honor applies only to qualities the world demands of all in similar circumstances, glory only to qualities no one can demand of anyone; honor pertains to merits anyone can publicly claim, glory to merits no one can claim for themselves.” He adds: “Honor thus attests only that this subject is no exception, while glory declares that they are one.” Honor is owed; one merely avoids losing it. Glory, on the other hand, is earned—only through exceptional achievements.
These achievements are acts or works, and Schopenhauer decisively favors the latter. Actions depend on opportunity, witness, a fading memory; works endure as they are in themselves, for as long as they last. Of Alexander the Great, only a memory remains; Plato, Aristotle, Homer—they are still present, alive, and directly active. The glory of deeds is uncertain and fleeting; that of works, slow to arrive, is the only kind assured.
Glory ≠ honor: negative, universal, lost only through fault, whereas glory is positive, exceptional, and gained through an extraordinary act or work. Nor is it the same as Aristotelian megalopsuchia: greatness of soul is an inner disposition, the judgment the magnanimous person holds of themselves, verified in their conduct; Schopenhauerian glory is an external judgment, the opinion of others that attaches afterward to a creation—and whose author, more often than not, does not even enjoy it in their lifetime.