Greek · Western philosophy

Homonoia

ὁμόνοια (homonoia)

Harmony: what Aristotle calls *"civil friendship"*, the agreement of a city on what must be willed and done. Not mere conformity of opinions—strangers may think alike about astronomy without any harmony between them—but practical understanding on shared interests: taking the same side and carrying out the common resolution together. It always applies to actions, and to those that matter to all. It assumes good people, for the wicked, through unchecked selfishness, are perpetually at odds.

La concorde aussi parait bien avoir quelque chose de l'amitié ; et voilà pourquoi il ne faut pas la confondre avec la conformité d'opinions
Aristote, Éthique à Nicomaque, Livre IX, ch. VI. La Morale d'Aristote, Ladrange, 1856 · trans. Jules Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire · source

The Greek word homonoia (ὁμόνοια)—literally “unity of thought”— denotes in Aristotle what he calls concord, which he ranks among the things of friendship. “Concord, too, seems to bear something of friendship; and that is why it must not be confused with agreement of opinions” (the corpus writes parait without a circumflex: paraît). The entire sixth chapter of the ninth book hinges on this warning against confusion.

For thinking the same thing as another is not the same as agreeing with them. Agreement of opinions can exist between people who do not know each other at all, and on a matter of no consequence. Two strangers who judge alike on astronomy have no concord for all that: being in agreement on such points implies no affection whatsoever. Concord requires something other than shared knowledge—it requires a shared will.

Aristotle thus locates it in action, not in speculation. “Concord therefore always pertains to deeds,” and among deeds, to those that matter and can be equally useful to all. A city is said to enjoy concord when its people agree on matters of general interest, take the same side, and carry out the common resolution together: that powers be elective, that they ally with such-and-such a people. It is in this sense that he calls it civic friendship—the philia extended to the scale of the city.

It finally presupposes good people. They desire what is just and beneficial to the common good, and they pursue it together. The wicked, incapable of concord except in fragments, quarrel over advantage and shirk duties and hardships; each wanting everything for themselves, they are perpetually at odds, forcing others without ever willing justice themselves. Unchecked selfishness dissolves the bond that concord forges.

Homonoia (concord) ≠ agreement of opinions: thinking alike on an abstract matter, even among strangers, does not make concord, which concerns actions and common interests. Homonoia ≠ eunoia: goodwill is an individual sentiment toward a person, whereas concord is the collective agreement of a city on what must be done. And concord is not forced unanimity: it assumes good people who agree freely, not wills compelled to the same side.

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