Greek · Western philosophy

Philia

φιλία (philia)

Aristotle on friendship: a kind of virtue, or at least always accompanied by virtue, and one of life’s most essential needs. The Greek word encompasses the whole range of affections, but Aristotle distinguishes three kinds based on what one loves in the other—utility, pleasure, or goodness. The first two are fragile: interest and pleasure fade, and friendship with them. Only the third, that of virtuous people who love one another *as* good, is the primary and true friendship—stable because its object, virtue, does not change. To be distinguished from Cicero’s *amicitia*, which shares its foundation but refines its ideal.

La suite de tout ce qui précède, c'est une théorie de l'amitié, parce que l'amitié est une sorte de vertu, ou du moins, qu'elle est toujours escortée de la vertu. Elle est en outre un des besoins les plus nécessaires de la vie
Aristote, Éthique à Nicomaque, Livre VIII, ch. I. La Morale d'Aristote, Ladrange, 1856 · trans. Jules Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire · source

The Greek word philia (φιλία) reaches further than our “friendship”: it encompasses the entire circle of human affections, from the bonds of the city to love. Aristotle devotes two entire books of the Nicomachean Ethics to it, placing it from the outset on a lofty plane—not as a convenience of life, but as one of its necessities. No one would choose to live without friends, even if they possessed all other goods. The theory of friendship naturally follows that of the virtues, “because friendship is a kind of virtue, or at least always accompanied by virtue.”

We love, says Aristotle, what is good, pleasant, or useful—hence three kinds of friendship, depending on the motive. Friendship of utility unites those who derive some advantage from one another; friendship of pleasure, those who take mutual delight in each other. Both are real, but incidental: one does not love the friend for themselves, but for what they provide. Thus, they dissolve as soon as utility or pleasure fades. These are friendships of resemblance, friendships of circumstance.

Only the third is complete. “The first and true friendship will be for us that of the virtuous and good, who love each other insofar as they are good and virtuous.” Here, one loves the other for who they are, and their good for its own sake; and since virtue endures, so does this friendship. It requires time, mutual familiarity, equality of souls—which makes it rare and reserved for few. Even the magnanimous person, who is self-sufficient, needs it to exercise their goodness toward others; and prudence knows that no one lives well entirely alone.

Philia-virtue ≠ philia-interest ≠ philia-pleasure: one word, three ways of loving, only one of which endures. The kinship with Cicero’s amicitia is clear—both ground true friendship in virtue alone and declare it lasting because virtue does not change. But Cicero inherits and refines: he makes the friend an alter idem, a second self, and scarcely acknowledges anything but perfect friendship. Aristotle, by contrast, preserves lesser friendships as derivative forms of friendship, and situates philia within the economy of a happy life—eudaimonia does not unfold in solitude.

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