Proairesis
προαίρεσις (proairesis)
In Epictetus, *prohairesis* is the faculty of choice: the power to grant or withhold assent, to judge, to will. It is the only thing he considers fully "up to us" (*eph' hēmin*), because nothing external—neither master, nor torture, nor the gods—can compel it. The body, possessions, reputation do not depend on it; *prohairesis* does. All Stoic freedom resides in this faculty, and nowhere else.
tu enchaîneras ma cuisse ; mais ma faculté de juger et de vouloir, Jupiter lui-même ne peut en triompher
The Greek word proairesis (προαίρεσις) literally means “prior choice”—what is set forth (pro-) before action through deliberation. Before Epictetus, the term was primarily technical in Aristotle. Epictetus makes it the center of his ethics: proairesis is the only domain where man is sovereign, for it alone escapes all external constraint. His translator Guyau renders it sometimes as “will,” sometimes as “faculty of judging and willing.”
From this stems the division that opens the Handbook: things are divided between those that depend on us—opinion, desire, aversion, all works of proairesis—and those that do not. To be free, for Epictetus, is not to get what one wants, but to want only what falls under this inviolable faculty.
To be distinguished from Taoist wu-wei, which relaxes the effort of will rather than concentrating it: where Epictetus strengthens a subject master of its assent, Taoism tends to dissolve the subject into the flow of transformations. Proairesis is a citadel; wu-wei, an open door.