Tristesse
tristitia (latin scolastique)
In Spinoza, sadness is not a mood but a passage: the diminishing of the power to act, the crossing of a threshold toward lesser perfection. It is the exact counterpart of joy. Every sad passion makes us less capable of acting and understanding.
La Tristesse est le passage de l'homme d'une plus grande à une moindre perfection.
As with joy, the decisive word is passage. Sadness is not a lower degree of perfection—it is the very movement by which one descends from one degree to another. We do not “possess” sadness; we pass through it, in the direction of diminution.
The relation to power-to-act is direct: since the effort by which each thing perseveres in its being is its very reality, anything that diminishes it is experienced as sadness. Sadness is thus the affective sign of a hindered power—not a sin, not a fault, but a drop in the existence’s operating level.
From this follows a consequence Spinoza fully embraces: no sad passion is ever good in itself. Where a certain morality extols contrition or mortification, the Ethics holds that sadness, as such, always makes us less perfect—that is, less real.