Freedom as Relation, Not Isolation

Freedom always stands between two pitfalls: the illusion of a sovereign subject, cut off from all, and the dissolution of that same subject into an order that transcends it. Three schools of thought, three rejections of modern individualism, three ways of conceiving freedom as relation. But relation to what? To oneself, to the world, or to others in the act of writing their history? Each offers a distinct answer, before a common summit may yet emerge.

Epictetus: Freedom Through Detachment from Representations

Epictetus does not speak of freedom, but of inner strength. This strength does not lie in the accumulation of goods or power, but in the ability to distinguish what depends on us from what does not. The subject is not an isolated atom, but a space where this distinction is exercised. Freedom, here, is an operation of the mind: it consists in refusing to be alienated by what escapes our control.

It was neither reputation, nor wealth, nor power; it was his inner strength—that is, his convictions about what depends on us and what does not.

In this perspective, relation is first and foremost a relation to oneself. The external world—reputation, wealth, power—is not denied, but relegated to what does not depend on us. Freedom is exercised in the gap between what is ours (our judgments, our desires) and what is not. It is not a state, but a constant labor of sorting, a discipline of representations. The subject is not an absolute master, but a guardian of its own boundaries.

This freedom is not solitary in the sense of ignoring others. It is solitary in that it refuses to be defined by them. Reputation, for example, is an illusion: it depends on the judgments of others, and thus on what lies beyond our control. Epictetan freedom is a negative relation to the world: it is won by detaching from what is not us, in order to better refocus on what is.

Spinoza: Freedom as Participation in the Eternal

Spinoza, too, does not speak of freedom in terms of isolation. For him, the soul is not a closed substance, but a part of a whole. Freedom is not an individual conquest, but the recognition of belonging. It emerges when the soul understands itself through the nature of God—that is, as an eternal truth.

DEMONSTRATION This intellectual Love necessarily follows from the nature of the Soul insofar as it is considered, through the nature of God, as an eternal truth (Prop.

Here, relation is ontological. The soul is not an autonomous subject, but a mode of the divine substance. Freedom does not consist in detaching from the world, but in inscribing oneself within it as a necessary part. It is not an act of will, but a demonstration: it flows from the very nature of the soul, insofar as it understands itself as eternal.

Unlike Epictetus, Spinoza does not propose a distinction between what depends on us and what does not. Everything depends on God, and the soul, as it participates in this necessity, is free. Freedom is not a rejection of the world, but an understanding of one’s place within it. It is not mastery, but adherence to the order of things.

This freedom is relational in the most radical sense: it is impossible without the recognition of a whole that transcends it. The subject is not an individual, but a mode of substance. Its freedom is not a property, but a consequence of its nature.

Mbembe: Freedom as Collective Reinvention

Mbembe does not speak of freedom in metaphysical terms, but historical ones. Freedom is not a question of detachment or belonging, but of difference and self-determination. It is not won in isolation, but in the reinvention of the bonds that structure a community.

Difference and self-determination Liberalism and racial pessimism 121 A man like any other?

Here, relation is political. Freedom is not a matter of representations or participation in a whole, but of the capacity to define the terms of one’s existence. Mbembe questions the conditions of this self-determination: how can a subject free itself from the categories that negate it? Freedom is not a state, but a process, a struggle to redefine the boundaries of the human.

Unlike Epictetus, Mbembe does not propose detachment from the world, but its transformation. Unlike Spinoza, he does not seek to inscribe himself in an eternal order, but to invent a new one. Freedom is not a matter of truth, but of history: it plays out in collective action, in the rewriting of the narratives that determine what is possible.

This freedom is relational in that it presupposes a community in motion. It is not an individual property, but a collective capacity to redefine the terms of relation. The subject is neither master of its representations nor part of a whole, but an actor in a history in the making.

Three Rejections of Isolation, Three Relations to the World

These three thinkers reject modern individualism, but in radically different ways. For Epictetus, freedom is a separation: it consists in distinguishing what is ours from what is not. For Spinoza, it is a participation: it emerges from the recognition of belonging to a whole. For Mbembe, it is a reinvention: it presupposes the transformation of the bonds that structure a community.

Each proposes a specific relation to the world:

• Epictetus: a negative relation, founded on detachment.
• Spinoza: an ontological relation, founded on belonging.
• Mbembe: a historical relation, founded on transformation.

These differences are not nuances, but fundamental oppositions. Yet they converge on one point: freedom is not isolation. It is always a relation—to oneself, to the world, or to others.

The Common Summit: Freedom as Work

Though these three thinkers diverge, they share a distrust of the illusion of a sovereign subject, cut off from all. For Epictetus, freedom is work on oneself. For Spinoza, it is a demonstration of one’s place in the order of things. For Mbembe, it is a struggle to redefine the terms of one’s existence.

In all three cases, freedom is not a given, but work. It is not a property, but a practice. It is not a state, but a process.

This work takes different forms:

• Epictetus: a work of distinction (what depends on us / what does not).
• Spinoza: a work of understanding (the soul as eternal truth).
• Mbembe: a work of reinvention (self-determination as struggle).

But in all three, freedom is a relation—never isolation. It always presupposes a rapport: to oneself, to the world, or to others. It is never an end in itself, but a means of situating oneself in the world.

Conclusion: Three Paths to the Same Question

Freedom is not an abstract question. It is always a concrete one: how to situate oneself in the world? Epictetus answers through detachment. Spinoza through belonging. Mbembe through transformation.

These answers are not compatible, but they ask the same question: how to escape isolation without losing oneself in a whole? How to be free without being alone?

The answer, perhaps, lies in the work each of these thinkers proposes. Work that is never finished, but always ongoing. Work that is never solitary, but always relational.