Totémisme
At Philippe Descola’s, totemism isn’t the worship of an animal emblem nor a mere method of classifying clans, but one of the four ways of identifying existents—one that assumes between humans and non-humans *similar interiorities* AND *similar physicalities*. A double continuity: classes mixing men, plants, and beasts share the same essence, inherited from a common prototype, most often an ancestor of the *Dreaming*. It’s the exact symmetry of modern naturalism, which separates on both levels what totemism unites.
le totémisme cultuel — et le totémisme « de rêve » qui en est une variante individuelle — repose donc sur une identification spirituelle des humains, des totems et des espèces qui leur sont affiliées, chacun d’entre eux étant présent au monde en tant qu’expression singularisée d’un même prototype immatériel incarné dans un corps.
Descola inherits the term from a long anthropological tradition and shifts its meaning. For Lévi-Strauss, totemism was primarily a matter of classification: human groups distinguish themselves from one another by borrowing their names from species, the homology of differences between a natural series and a social one. Descola sets aside this classificatory use to focus on what his predecessor had dismissed—the “properly ontological aspects” of the phenomenon, those Australian Aboriginal societies where one posits “a deep physical and psychic affinity between humans and their totems.”
Here lies the intellectual maneuver. Totemism names one of the four combinations arising from the interplay of resemblances and differences “between self and other in terms of interiority and physicality.” It is the only one where the two coincide: similar interiorities, similar physicalities. Humans, animals, plants, and landscape features form a single class because they stem from the same Dreaming being and share “the essence and destiny” of that prototype. The totem is not a symbol imposed upon the clan—it is the matrix from which both clan and species are parallel incarnations. A double continuity, where the modern naturalist imposes a double rupture.
Descola’s totemism ≠ animism: animism unifies living beings through interiority while separating them by body—the bear has a soul like mine, but a different body. Totemism, by contrast, extends resemblance to the body: human and totem are of the same essence and substance. And totemism ≠ naturalism, its exact opposite: where we separate beings on both planes, recognizing only a common matter, totemism binds them on both. That leaves analogism, the fourth category, which disjoins everything only to stitch it back together.