---
title: "Nature as Subject: Three Irreducible Foundations"
sousTitre: "Pantheism, Relational Cosmology, and the Critique of Colonial Modernity"
description: "Between Spinoza, Krenak, and Escobar, the subjectivity of nature unfolds along incommensurable lines: an immanent power that negates all human transcendence, a machine for producing things that alienates the living, or a relational ontology that decenters the human. These three propositions, though they never converge, sketch a shared refusal: that of a nature reduced to the status of resource. Their very divergence reveals the urgency of a thought that does not content itself with reforming the law, but questions the very conditions of possibility for a world in which the Earth ceases to be an object."
date: 2026-11-08
lang: en
tradition: undefined
auteurs: ["Baruch Spinoza", "Ailton Krenak", "Arturo Escobar"]
---
# Nature as Subject: Three Irreducible Foundations

In the order of reasons where nature is no longer a resource but a subject, three voices echo without ever aligning. Each carves a path where the world’s subjectivity unfolds according to its own logic: that of a power sufficient unto itself, that of an alienation to undo, or that of a relation to restore. These propositions do not overlap. Nor do they complement one another. Their strength lies precisely in their irreducibility. Before any attempt at convergence, they must be heard in their radical singularity.

## Immanent Power: Spinoza and the Erasure of Transcendence

Spinoza offers a subjectivity of nature that owes nothing to human projection. It emerges from a critique of the vulgar conception of God, where divine power is imagined in man’s image. The passage from the *Ethics* is unequivocal:

> Moreover, if I wished to pursue this further, I could also show here that this power which the vulgar ascribe to God is not only a human power (which proves that God is conceived by the vulgar as a man or in man’s likeness), but also involves impotence.
>
> — **Baruch Spinoza**, *ethique*, livre I, § 3. éd. after the French translation by Charles Appuhn, 1913.

For Spinoza, nature’s subjectivity is not a symbolic or legal attribution. It is the direct consequence of an ontology where God and nature are one (*Deus sive Natura*). If the vulgar attribute human power to God, it is because they conceive Him as a separate subject, endowed with will and purpose. Yet this conception is already a form of impotence: it presupposes a lack, a distance between creator and creation. Spinozist subjectivity of nature is thus a subjectivity without a subject, a power that operates without intention, without design, without hierarchy. It does not require human recognition to exist, for it is the very condition of all existence.

This subjectivity is immanent because it refers to no transcendence. It is not a quality added to nature but its very definition. Nature is not an object to be possessed or exploited, for it is the totality of modes through which the infinite substance unfolds. Any attempt to reduce it to a resource is a misunderstanding of its essence: it amounts to confusing a finite mode with the substance itself. Spinozist subjectivity of nature is thus a subjectivity without remainder, a power that cannot be grasped by the categories of law or morality, for it precedes and exceeds them.

## The Machine for Making Things: Krenak and the Alienation of the Living

Krenak approaches nature’s subjectivity from an entirely different angle. It is not a metaphysical given but the result of a historical and technological rupture. His argument revolves around a central image: that of the *machine for making things*. The text, drawn from a conversation, does not explicitly name nature as a subject but outlines its contours through negation:

> THE MACHINE FOR MAKING THINGS — Text based on the live conversation *Conversa Selvagem* with Ailton Krenak and Marcelo Gleiser, April 17.
>
> — **Ailton Krenak**, *A vida n o til*. éd. Companhia das Letras, São Paulo, 2020.

Here, the machine is not merely a tool. It is the symbol of a system that turns the living into objects, relations into transactions, the Earth into a resource. Krenak does not speak of subjectivity in legal or philosophical terms but in terms of resistance. Nature ceases to be a resource when it escapes the logic of the machine—that is, when it is no longer raw material to exploit but a partner to listen to.

This subjectivity is inseparable from a critique of modernity. The machine for making things is not neutral: it embodies a worldview where everything must be useful, quantifiable, productive. Within this framework, nature has value only if it serves a human purpose. The subjectivity Krenak envisions is thus a relational one, but not a symmetrical relation. It requires a decentering of the human, an acknowledgment that the Earth does not need us to exist, though we need it to survive.

In this sense, the machine is the enemy of subjectivity. It is what reduces nature to a stock of resources, what denies any agency to the living. For Krenak, nature’s subjectivity is not an intrinsic property but a condition to restore: that of a world where things are no longer things but beings in relation.

## Relational Ontologies: Escobar and the Critique of Modern Dualism

Escobar addresses the question of nature’s subjectivity through a critique of dualist ontologies. His argument does not focus directly on law but on the epistemological conditions that make possible the conception of nature as a resource. The key passage from *[Sentir-pensar](https://viasophia.org/lexique/sentir-pensar/) con la Tierra* is unambiguous:

> The aim is to problematize modern dualist ontologies and open ourselves to the relational ontologies that characterize the Earth and the worlds of peoples tied to place and territory.
>
> — **Arturo Escobar**, *Sentir-penser avec la Terre*. éd. original Spanish edition.

For Escobar, nature’s subjectivity is not a matter of metaphysics or technology but of ontology. It emerges from a challenge to the modern categories that oppose subject and object, human and non-human, culture and nature. These dualisms underpin the Western conception of nature as a resource: they allow it to be treated as an external object, available for exploitation.

Relational ontologies, by contrast, do not separate the human from the rest of the living. They do not conceive of the Earth as a set of resources but as a network of relations where each being has its place and agency. In this perspective, nature’s subjectivity is not a property granted to an object but a way of being in the world. It presupposes an [ecology of knowledges](https://viasophia.org/lexique/ecologie-des-savoirs/), where Indigenous and local knowledge are not ethnographic curiosities but modes of relating to the Earth that challenge the very foundations of modernity.

Escobar does not propose a legal subjectivity but an epistemological one. Nature is not a subject of rights because rights are conferred upon it, but because it has always been a subject in worlds where the human is not separated from the rest of the living. The critique of dualist ontologies is thus a prerequisite for any legal recognition: as long as nature is thought of as an object, any attribution of rights will remain a fiction.

## Convergence Without Synthesis: Three Refusals of the Resource

These three propositions do not converge. Nor do they oppose one another. Their common ground lies elsewhere: in a shared refusal of nature as a resource. For Spinoza, this refusal is metaphysical: nature is not a resource because it is substance itself, a power that cannot be reduced to an object. For Krenak, it is political: nature is not a resource because it escapes the logic of the machine, the quantification of the living. For Escobar, it is epistemological: nature is not a resource because relational ontologies do not separate it from the human.

This negative convergence may well be their strength. It shows that nature’s subjectivity cannot be a mere legal reform, an addition to positive law. It requires a deeper transformation: a questioning of the categories that found modernity. Spinoza, Krenak, and Escobar do not speak the same language, but they speak against the same thing: the idea that the Earth is a stock of resources to exploit.

Their very divergence is instructive. It reveals that nature’s subjectivity is not a univocal concept but a plurality of propositions that resist synthesis. It is at once an immanent power, a resistance to the machine, and a relational ontology. These three dimensions do not exclude one another, but neither do they overlap. They sketch the contours of a world where nature ceases to be an object without becoming a subject in the sense understood by modern law.

One question remains, unanswered: how to think this subjectivity without reducing it to a new category, without turning it into a new dogma? Perhaps by accepting that it cannot be contained within a definition. Perhaps by recognizing that nature as subject is not a solution but an open question—one that traverses metaphysics, politics, and epistemology without ever being fully grasped.

## Sources

- Baruch Spinoza, *ethique* — Wikisource (trad. Charles Appuhn, 1913), trans. Charles Appuhn
- Ailton Krenak, *A vida n o til* — Companhia das Letras, São Paulo, 2020, trans. trad. maison (du portugais)
- Arturo Escobar, *Sentir-penser avec la Terre* — 


Canonical source : https://viasophia.org/en/essais/2026-11-08-nature-comme-sujet-trois-fondements/
